T he old adage, "on the internet no one knows you're a dog" is rapidly fading as anonymity fades away.
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SAIS Review Summer-Fall 2016 ungoverned space in existence. Arguably every single attribute of the internet and its connected services is subject to some form of governance. The decision processes within both international politics and institutional politics from the supranational to the sub-state level govern the capacities and capabilities of all actors to interact. To understand the legal and policy constraints on military operations resident within what the US military defines as an operational domain, one must start small in scale and historically distant and work up to the large-scale organizational decisions that are temporally present. The governance structures of the internet cannot be examined from a purely realist perspective without taking into consideration the construction of the underlying laws and policies that define the operational environment. While parsimony dictates that one must center any argument in a single level of analysis, such a starting point in the context of internet governance and state action ignores the crucial ontological foundations that govern how state and subs-state actors behave and interact.
At a macro-level of analysis, the internet is best defined as a sociotechnical-economic system of systems. 4 At the micro-level, the internet and its connected devices and protocols, which define its operations, are rooted in code and hardware. Code according to Lawrence Lessig constitutes a form of law and establishes a logical structure that defines the basic operation of an environment. 5 In conventional domains of land, sea, air and space the laws of nature define what is and is not possible, but on the internet "code" is defined by programmers. The selection of certain protocols over others at the core of the internet has a historical basis in decisions that evolved from a small working group to a request for comment (RFC) process, and then to a more institutionalized structure of individual, state, corporate, and non-state interests engaging in non-governmental institutional structures. These organizations fall under the umbrella of the Internet Society with its partners the internet Architecture Board (IAB), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) and other governance organizations. 6 Beyond the policies and protocols within the primary technical governance institutions listed above are local and national laws that govern issues such as data privacy, retention, registration of users, filtration of content, surveillance of individuals within a given jurisdiction, and more. Many nations, including the United States, are actively working to develop information sharing organizations to inform others of known vulnerabilities within software and hardware platforms within and across various types of organizations. 7 Where local and national law and policy have failed to fully achieve desired outcomes, states have turned to international working groups, treaties, and agreements on issues of transnational criminal behavior. States have also utilized informal commitments to normative behaviors and even the initial stages of acceptable There is no other environment of state interaction where everything from the laws of the basic functioning of the environment to agreements on how individuals should behave within that environment, have been so clearly addressed. There is not a consensus on many of the higher-level normal behaviors that will be examined, yet constraints imposed by lower level agreements confine state actions to areas that are non-random and likely in conformity with the nuances of various aspects of international law. 10 It is not possible here to provide a lengthy analysis of all the governance structures above organizations and their areas of control, yet it is valuable to examine several in more detail in order to provide a measure of context for how and why states do what they do in cyberspace.
The RFC Process and Protocol Design: The Basic Building Blocks of Governance
Despite the prognostications of movies such as Eagle Eye or the Bruce Willis Thriller Live Free or Die Hard, the underlying rules of the internet are not random, nor is the domain one in which magical strokes on a keyboard can be easily directed to disable an entire country. Rather, the basic functioning of the internet from its early days as a project under the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to the present has been rooted in a technical egalitarian process based largely on technical need rather than political expedience or necessity. The process originated in 1969 with Steve Crocker and has been adapted and incorporated by the Internet Society and in particular the Internet Engineering Task Force. 11 RFCs propose actual standards as well specific draft areas for standards, internet standards for shared protocols, informational documents, and historical documentation. The objective of the RFC process is a largely open source technically meritocratic process to advance the best technical solutions. It is a working group focused process with emphasis placed on peer-review, consistency with existing norms, and technical rigor. 12 One of the more interesting features of the Internet Society and its affiliated partners is its openness to the public at large. While state level actors can be involved in the Internet Society, their voices on any given RFC are no greater than a technical expert in any given field. The Society is open for anyone to become a member. 13 The openness of the structure is contentious in that it 14 The results are technical specifications that might contradict traditional sovereign applications of law, but that facilitate efficiency and interoperability. However, as will be demonstrated, the lack of complete national control over the technical specifications opens doors for actions conducted in and through cyberspace that challenge sovereign state authorities.
Although there is not an overarching state or supranational entity, the Internet Society and its affiliates constitute a robust decentralized governance structure able to solve many of the issues traditionally associated with complex decision-making. In a complex commons in which inter-operative standards are necessary for the operation of the internet, the problem-solving capacity of the RFC process has resulted in much of the underlying technical framework upon which we depend today.
The standards developed through the organizational procedures of the IETF and the IRTF, under the guidance of Internet Architecture Board (IAB), establish the basic laws of nature for any action in cyberspace, including potential military actions. Standards, such as those that increase the security, decrease the openness, improve resilience, or make any number of other potential technical changes could be developed and approved. Any standard developed is likely to affect the potential for states to leverage cyberspace for military needs. Recognizing the important role that non-governmental organizations play in the development of the internet is critically important. Although many of the original members of these organizations had deep relationships with the US government, the trend has been shifting towards more international inclusion with a diversity of interests. 15 These international actors, each with different perspectives and experiences, will challenge the implicit or explicit interests of the United States. This challenge is likely to be minimal in the short term, as the overarching mission of these organizations remains largely centered in the maintenance of a high quality open inter-networked infrastructure. 16 However, as the multi-stakeholder nature of internet governance continues, it may result in outcomes unfavorable to the United States. The potential for undesirable outcomes in governance at the core level of standards development is often rooted in the interests of other state actors. The next section briefly takes up the challenge of an increasing desire by states to become involved in the governance of the internet.
The State in the Governance of the Internet
The internet developed largely outside the control of a single state and as a result its rapid proliferation around the world has challenged the sovereign jurisdictional boundaries of states in ways previously unencountered. The internet provides a vehicle for information distribution and financial transactions to occur outside of traditional state control. 17 In turn, these challenges have provided impetus for nations to focus on wrestling control of the internet into a supranational body better able to represent their policy preferences. Actors at all levels disagree on the role of states in the management of the internet. 20 Corporate interests are largely aligned with states that argue against state control over the internet for fear of a fractured internet composed of nationally controlled network infrastructures with divergent rules and regulations or hardware and software standards. 21 While the 2012 failure of WICT appears to have been a body blow to state control of the internet, the 2013 release of classified materials by Edward Snowden seems to have given new life to state efforts at control. 22 Efforts by countries to change the fundamental rules associated with the transit of data have increased in the post-Snowden era. 23 The implementation of state control over the internet under the banner of privacy and sovereignty protections has risen to new heights in both democratic and less-than democratic states, whether with national laws and policies on data localization, internet localization, or a variety of other related issues. A fragmented internet, if it were to develop, would offer new challenges and opportunities to states who wished to leverage cyberspace for state actions.
Bi-lateral Norm Development and State Actions in Cyberspace
Beyond the formal non-governmental, governmental and supranational governmental structures of states are ad hoc agreements or bi-lateral negotiations between states that build on existing legal and normative structures to establish commonly accepted behaviors. Bi-lateral agreements decrease information asymmetries between states, which leads to a reduction in tensions. It is no
The internet developed largely outside the control of a single state and as a result its rapid proliferation around the world has challenged the sovereign jurisdictional boundaries of states in ways previously unencountered.
SAIS Review Summer-Fall 2016 secret that over the last decade states such as the United States and China have engaged in increasingly hostile actions against one another in cyberspace. 24 The frustration of the United States over China's aggressive cyber operations against US corporations resulted in high-level talks between US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2015. During the visit, a mutual understanding on the acceptable use of cyber operations against other states was discussed and a basic framework of behavior was informally agreed upon. 25 Although the informal agreement was subject to significant skepticism, independent analysis by the cybersecurity firm FireEye indicates that the agreement has had a significant positive effect in reducing the number of severe cyber-attacks perpetrated by China against US corporations. Bi-lateral agreements governing mutual behavior between states can be both beneficial and detrimental to the goals and objectives of the United States. Recent movement in NATO on its role in the cyber domain, specifically a cyberdefense pledge, offers measurable improvements in mutual understanding on how states within the alliance will interpret cyber-attacks against member nations and how they will respond. 27 Conversely, a recent nonaggression pact made between China and Russia potentially increases US fears. 28 As the brief anecdotes above indicate, there are many layers to internet governance. Each of these layers affects the ability of nations, specifically the United States, to leverage cyberspace for military and intelligence objectives. The next section builds on the understanding that the internet is not devoid of laws which govern it, but that it is a complex environment within which actions carry significant consequences.
When States Decide to Attack
What should be clear is that the complex nature of internet governance highlights that the domain is not an ungoverned space in the traditional sense. Nor is there a lack of effort by actors at almost every level to develop governance structures. It is precisely because of the complex structures of governance that the United States and others are cautious about how they leverage cyberspace to achieve state objectives. States are rational actors in cyberspace. 29 Just because there are laws and governance structures does not necessarily indicate that they will follow said laws. Just as criminals fail to follow laws in perpetrating a crime when they feel they have a reasonable probability of escaping capture, so too will states engage in violations of the laws, policies, and governance structures of the internet when they do not fear reliable attribution or consequence.
The United States expends large amounts of effort to engage at various levels of internet governance. Even in the wake of the Snowden releases, the The Most Governed Ungoverned Space issues undertaken for intelligence collection and national security with the core standing of the United States. 30 The governance of the internet in terms of technical standards, international, and domestic laws and norms weighs heavily on the US decision-calculus of whether to engage in any and all actions in cyberspace. Several well-known examples of attacks attributed 31 to the United States, such as Stuxnet and Flame, would seem to indicate that the attacker followed the letter of international law in a manner mostly consistent with interpretations of the law of armed conflict. 32 To assume that cyberspace is ungoverned would obviate the need for adherence to laws relevant in other domains. This, however, is not the case. Most states based on analyses of data through 2011 largely apply non-cyber specific interpretations of international law to actions conducted in cyberspace. 33 Adherence to non-cyber specific laws in cyberspace is not universal, as recent incidents in Ukraine and New York indicate. Some state actors appear to be testing the limits of acceptable behavior in cyberspace in ways that would be considered clear violations of international law in physical domains of operation. 34 Yet the absence of direct consequence does not reflect the absence of governance. The attack against a minor spillway gate in New York violated numerous state and federal laws, many of which were written well prior to major state cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure.
The Department of Defense is explicit in its adherence to applicable laws with regards to actions conducted in cyberspace. In Joint Publication 3-12, "Cyber Operations," the opening letter to joint doctrine mandates that commanders conform to US laws, regulations, and doctrine. 35 The doctrine document goes further by distributing the functions of cyberspace operations into categorically different unit types, each with specific authorities and responsibilities. The specificity of role and function is not accidental. It is designed simultaneously for efficiency of function and adherence to applicable laws.
Responsibilities are broken down in to primary functions within the DoD into Offensive Cyber Operations (OCO), DoD Information Network Operations (DoDin-Ops), Defensive Cyber Operations (DCO), Defensive Cyber Operations -Response Action (DCO-RA), and Cyber Protection (CPT) Teams.
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Each of the services has specific field manuals on the roles and responsibilities of operators in leveraging various tools of war. The Army's current unclassified doctrine document on Cyber Electromagnetic Operations (CEMA) is Field Manual 38. Sections 3-38 through 3-42 provide an overview of the roles and responsibilities of operational commanders in engaging in cyber operations. Specifically, commanders must be in compliance with all US laws as well as adhere to the principles of the laws of war. 37 In documents leaked by Snowden, the rigor with which the United States attempts to adhere to standards of law is clear. 36 SAIS Review Summer-Fall 2016 only the President or his duly appointed representative may authorize an offensive cyber-attack by the United States against a foreign party. 38 Even then, the application of force through cyberspace is done with caution and an apparent respect for international law.
When the United States wants to engage in offensive cyber operations it must contend with nearly every aspect governing cyberspace, from laws to the technical constraints imposed by standards adopted in many of the organizations highlighted above. Yet, the constraints of law, policy, standards, and technical infrastructure are only part of the overall story. The internet is not an entirely public space. Although some countries have nationalized infrastructure and internet service providers, the United States in particular is heavily dependent on private entities for the provision of its services. For everything from land-based fiber lines that connect military installations within the continental United States, to the trans-oceanic fiber lines and satellites that connect remote bases and operational units, the United States purchases services from private entities. 39 These contracts always entail service level agreements that define acceptable standards of behavior on the networks. Behaviors such as offensive or defensive cyber operations with response actions can violate service agreements, strain network providers, and result in retaliation against networks in unintended ways. These consequences can be severe, resulting in service degradation for other customers beyond the Department of Defense.
Decisions to leverage cyberspace by the United States are neither immediate nor without thought towards consequence. The domain is still quite new and its applications for militaries around the world are likely to grow as the number of connected devices increases from 17 billion today to a forecasted 50 billion within the next 10 years. 40 Whereas the kinetic effects of a bomb to a large extent are isolated spatially and temporally (although not psychologically) the effects of a cyber-attack can quickly extend beyond intended spatial, temporal, and psychological confines. 41 
The Painful Reality of Internet Governance and State Cyber Operations
The internet is not, as some might claim, an ungoverned domain. It is a highly governed domain within which states and other actors often violate, both knowingly and unknowingly, the norms, laws, and policies of other states and the international community in order to achieve certain outcomes. All actors operate within the confines of overlapping governance structures that define everything from the physics (code) of the domain to the appropriate behaviors of actors within that domain. Challenges arise when actors disagree on the When the United States wants to engage in offensive cyber operations it must contend with nearly every aspect governing cyberspace, from laws to the technical constraints imposed by standards adopted in many of the organizations highlighted above. 37 The Most Governed Ungoverned Space roles and responsibilities of states, corporations, and others. As the internet grows and expands from its current penetration of approximately 50% of the global population to the entire population over the next few years 42 and as the number of devices and systems connected globally increases, the challenges of governance are going to grow more acute. The simple yet painful reality is that the world is at the beginning of the digital revolution. The decision-making processes of states will change as the environment evolves.
The current US decision-making process on engaging in cyber operations indicates a deep understanding of the complexities of cyberspace and the overlapping governance structures it entails. Most states similarly recognize these structures. A few actors have been willing to test the limits of acceptable behavior in cyberspace, but these tests have not been without international condemnation.
The histories of governance over land, sea, air and space domains are long compared to that of cyberspace. The interactions of states in these domains still results in pockets lacking effective governance. Cyberspace will continue to resemble an ungoverned space, but the reality is that it is the most governed of ungoverned spaces.
Notes

